Epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with the nature, conditions, and extent of human knowledge. It asks questions like: “What. CAN EMPIRICAL KNOWLEDGE HAVE A FOUNDATION. advertisement A FOUNDATION? Laurence Bonjour Again, what is the doctrine of the given???. Reading Bonjour, and this essay is a little wordy. Anyone care to summarize?.

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Thus an adequate consideration of foundationalism need concern itself with nothing stronger than moderate foundationalism. I argued there that the fundamental role which the requirement of epistemic justification serves in the overall rationale of the concept of knowledge is that of a means to truth; and accordingly that a basic constraint on any account of the standards of justification for empirical knowledge is that there be good reasons for thinking that following those standards is at least likely to lead to truth.

First, the feature that makes a belief justified in a basic way must itself provide us with a good reason to accept that belief. Beliefs of kind K are connected in a law-like way with the sorts of states of affairs which would make them true, and therefore are highly likely to be emmpirical. Ali Hasan – knowleddge Philosophical Studies 2: But coherence will never suffice to pick out one system of beliefs, since there will always be many other alternative, incompatible systems of belief which are equally coherent and hence equally justified according to the CTEK.

Alston – – Synthese 55 April: Therefore, B is highly likely to be true. As will become clear, the key test for any version of foundationalism is whether it can solve the regress problem which motivates its very existence without resorting to essentially ad hoc stipulation. It is these more rudimentary states which are thus, according to this position, the ultimate source of epistemic justification; although basic beliefs are indeed the most basic beliefs, they are thus not the most basic cognitive states.

OK, so Bonjour’s arguing against the foundationalist view in epistemology. The problem of free will.

Historical versions of foundationalism have virtually always been interested in logical infallibility, in part at least because a claim of nomological infallibility would presumably depend for its justification on empirical evidence for the law of nature in question, so that a belief whose justification depended on such a claim could not be basic. Both of these approaches have in fact been attempted. What is important is that this immediately apprehended state of affairs is not itself a belief or any sort of cognitive state since, if it were, it too would require further justification.


Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. How would you characterize this notion??? Probability and Coherence Justification. Indeed, many recent proponents of foundationalism have felt that even moderate foundationalism goes further than is necessary with regard to the degree of intrinsic or noninferential justification ascribed to basic beliefs. Anyone care to summarize? A proponent of logical infallibility must claim that this is, in the cases he is interested in, not logically possible, but it is hard to see what the basis for such a claim might be, so long as S1 andS2 are conceded to be separate states of affairs.

But this view rejects premise 4 of the antifoundationalist argument by arguing that the believer’s cognitive grasp of the premises required for that justification does not involve further empirical beliefs, which would then themselves require justification.

The basic idea, after all, is to distinguish two aspects of a cognitive state, its capacity to justify other states and its own need for justification, and then try to find a state which possesses only the former aspect and not the latter. It will be helpful in the subsequent discussion to have available a slightly more explicit statement of this basic antifoundationalist argument: Thus this independent warrant must somehow be augmented if knowledge is to be achieved, and the usual appeal here is bonhour coherence hhave other such minimally warranted beliefs.

In the case of externalism the justifying state of affairs is part of the world itself, whereas in the case of classical givenism the justifying state of affairs epirical part of how the world is apprehended by the perceiver. Instead, for basic beliefs at least, it is sufficient that the premises for some favored variety of such argument merely be true, whether or not anyone realizes in any way that this is so.

Unfortunately, however, the meanings of these four terms have very rarely been made clear. For these reasons, weak foundationalism will be set aside, and my critical discussion of foundationalism will be formulated in application to moderate foundationalism.

Epistemicism and the Liar. The other issue to be considered is whether, in order for B to be justified for a particular person A at a particular timeit is necessary, not merely that a justification along the above lines exist in the abstract, but also that A himself be in cognitive possession of that justification, that is, that he believe the appropriate premises of forms 1 and 2 and that these beliefs be justified for him.


From Laurence BonJour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,

Why is that an issue??? B will have as its content the proposition that some empirical state of affairs S exists. Email required Address never made public. I will discuss this view, the doctrine of the empirically given, in Chapter 4.

Empriical can find the details of our flair system here. The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons. This goes on ad infinitum. Moderate foundationalism, as the label suggests, represents a relatively mild version of foundationalism.


Weak foundationalism seems to presuppose some kind of tradeoff ffoundation retention of basic beliefs and increased coherence, but neither the precise exchange rate for this tradeoff nor its underlying rationale are at all obvious. Request removal from index.

This is the basic claim of the CTEK for all varieties of observation. In particular, he caan 1 is going to be empirically justified. Hilary Kornblith – – Synthese 74 3: If we let F represent the feature or characteristic, whatever it may be, which distinguishes basic empirical beliefs from other empirical beliefs, then in an acceptable foundationalist account a particular empirical knowlerge B could qualify as basic only if the premises of the following justificatory argument were adequately justified: But if all this is correct, we toundation the disturbing result that B is not basic after all, since its justification depends on that of at least one other empirical belief.

And while it is much less clear how laaurence other two objections to coherence theories are to be answered, especially the second, the weak foundationalist seems at least to have a good deal more room for maneuver.

This article has no associated abstract. How does CTEK allow for the possibility of input from the world into the cognitive system, a possibility which is in fact realized in our cognitive system???